




 Working Papers of the Priority Programme 1859 
Experience and Expectation. 
Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour 
Edited by Alexander Nützenadel und Jochen Streb 
 
 No 26 (2020, October) 
 
 
Working Papers of the Priority Programme 1859  
„Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour” 









German Trade Forecasts since 1970 - 




Arbeitspapiere des Schwerpunktprogramms 1859 der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft  
„Erfahrung und Erwartung. Historische Grundlagen ökonomischen Handelns“ /  
Working Papers of the German Research Foundation’s Priority Programme 1859  
“Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour” 
 
Published in co-operation with the documentation and 





Redaktion: Alexander Nützenadel, Jochen Streb, Ingo Köhler 
V.i.S.d.P.: Alexander Nützenadel, Jochen Streb 
 
SPP 1859 "Erfahrung und Erwartung. Historische Grundlagen ökonomischen Handelns" 
Sitz der Geschäftsführung: 
Humboldt-Universität 
Friedrichstr. 191-193, 10117 Berlin 
Tel: 0049-30-2093-70615, Fax: 0049-30-2093-70644 
Web: https://www.experience-expectation.de 
Koordinatoren: Alexander Nützenadel, Jochen Streb 




Behrens, Christoph (2020): German Trade Forecasts since 1970 - An Evaluation Using the Panel Dimension. 
Working Papers of the Priority Programme 1859 “Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of 




© 2020 DFG-Schwerpunktprogramm 1859 „Erfahrung und Erwartung. Historische Grundlagen ökonomischen 
Handelns“ 
 
The opinions and conclusions set forth in the Working Papers of the Priority Programme 1859 Experience and 
Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour are those of the authors. Reprints and any other use for 
publication that goes beyond the usual quotations and references in academic research and teaching require the 
explicit approval of the editors and must state the authors and original source.
German Trade Forecasts since 1970
-




I evaluate German export growth and import growth forecasts published by eight profes-
sional forecasters for the years 1971 to 2019. The focus of the evaluation is on the weak
and strong efficiency as well as the unbiasedness of the forecasts. To this end, I use a novel
panel-data set and estimate fixed-effects models taking into account panel-corrected stan-
dard errors. For the full time period, I find that both export and import growth forecasts
are weakly but not strongly efficient. Unbiasedness depends on the forecast horizon being
analyzed, with longer-term four-quarter-ahead forecasts being biased. I, furthermore, check
for a possible change in forecasting behavior after incisive economic events in recent Ger-
man history. I find that the strong efficiency of the forecasts did not change substantially
over time. However, there is a change in forecasting behavior regarding the weak form of
efficiency after the financial crisis 2008/2009.
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1 Introduction
Economic recessions greatly influence international trade flows and trade policy. World trade
is typically more severely affected by economic crises than GDP growth (see, among others,
Freund, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2010; Berman and Martin, 2012; Chor and Manova, 2012, for
documentations of the decline in world trade after the financial crisis in 2008/2009). One reason
is, that often protectionist measures gain in popularity after strong economic recessions (Evenett,
2009; Kee et al., 2013). Durusoy et al. (2015), for instance, find that the number of export and im-
port quotas and tariffs in the EU have substantially increased after 2008. Other authors find that
the strong decline in trade after economic crises is caused by trade frictions (Behrens et al., 2013;
Eaton et al., 2016) or the disruption of international production chains (Bems et al., 2010). As
one of the world’s largest exporters, Germany heavily relies on international trade. It is, there-
fore, crucial for policy and investment decisions that professional forecasters publish reliable,
i.e., efficient and unbiased (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969; Holden and Peel, 1990), trade forecasts
for Germany. I, therefore, analyze the efficiency and unbiasedness of German export and import
growth forecasts for the years 1971 to 2019, published by eight professional forecasters.
The evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts for Germany has been the topic of numerous stud-
ies focusing on forecaster rankings (Sinclair et al., 2016), forecast revisions (Kirchgässner and
Müller, 2006), the underlying assumptions of forecasts (Engelke et al., 2019), the economic value
of forecasts (Döpke et al., 2018), forecast accuracy (Heilemann and Stekler, 2013), or forecast
efficiency (Behrens et al., 2018a, 2020). The vast majority of the studies analyze GDP growth
and inflation forecasts. The literature on the evaluation of trade forecasts, in contrast, is scarce,
despite the importance of international trade for the German economy. Behrens (2019, 2020)
analyzes German trade forecasts by means of machine learning techniques and finds evidence
against the efficiency of some German forecasters. Rather than evaluating forecasters indepen-
dently, I pool the data over all eight forecasters and focus on analyzing overall export growth and
import growth forecasts for Germany over time, since 1970.
To this end, I build on earlier literature on the change of forecasting behavior over time. This
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literature has especially focused on forecasting behavior before and after the financial crisis of
2008/2009. This literature has considered different causes of forecasting-behavior changes, such
as changes in the individuals responsible for the forecasts (Capistrán, 2008), changes in the loss
function (Wang and Lee, 2014), or changes in the expectation-formation process of the forecast-
ers (Frenkel et al., 2011; Pain et al., 2014). By means of a survey of German professional fore-
casters, Döpke et al. (2019b) find that forecasters tend to form more conservative forecasts after
the financial crisis of 2008/2009. In a quantitative approach Döpke et al. (2019a) find only small
differences in the forecasting behavior of German professional forecasters after the financial cri-
sis. Again, the vast majority of the relevant literature analyzes GDP and inflation forecasts. In
order to check for a possible change in forecasting behavior regarding trade forecasts, I evaluate
subsamples after incisive economic events in recent German history, namely the oil price shocks
in the early and late 1970s, German reunification, and the financial crisis of 2008/2009.
Keane and Runkle (1990) argue in an early application of panel-regressions to forecast evaluation
that pooling forecasts results in a more efficient evaluation of forecast rationality. Hence, I build
on research by Döpke and Fritsche (2006) and Döpke et al. (2019a), who analyze German GDP
and inflation forecasts by means of fixed-effects-panel regressions. To this end, I follow Döpke
et al. (2019a) and use Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), which have
better finite sample properties for time-series cross-sectional data than the also common feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator developed by Parks (1967).
I structure the remainder of the paper as follows: I present the data in Section 2. The empir-
ical analysis in Section 3 consists of a brief description of the estimation technique and tests
for efficiency as well as unbiasedness of the forecasts for the full sample and for subsamples
corresponding to incisive economic events in recent German history. In Section 4 I conclude.
2 Data
I use a modified version of a novel data set, which has recently been analyzed in nonparametric
forecast-evaluation studies by Behrens (2019, 2020). It consists of annual export growth and
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import growth forecasts for the years 1971 to 2019 published by seven German economic re-
search institutes and one collaboration of economic research institutes. Five of the forecasters
are among the largest politically and economically independent German economic research insti-
tutes, namely (in alphabetical order): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin (DIW),
Hamburgisches Weltwirtschaftsarchiv/-institut (HWWI)1, ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Munich (ifo), Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel (IfW), and Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung Essen (RWI).2 Two of the forecasters receive funding from interest groups,
i.e., Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung Düsseldorf (IMK), which is financed
by labor unions, and Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (IW), which is financed by em-
ployer’s associations. In addition, the list of forecasters comprises a collaboration of the leading
economic research institutes in Germany, the so called joint forecast or Gemeinschaftsdiagnose
(GD).
The research institutes publish forecasts midyear and at the turn of a year. The former forecasts
have a forecast horizon of two quarters and predict trade aggregates for the respective current
year, whereas the latter have a forecast horizon of four quarters and predict trade aggregates for
the respective upcoming year. The the total number of forecasts as well as the exact publication
dates vary across forecasters, resulting in a possible information advantage of forecasters who
publish their forecasts at later dates. I follow Döpke and Fritsche (2006) and Döpke et al. (2019a)
and account for this issue by means of a fixed-effects-panel regression (see Section 3.1). In order
to compute forecast errors, I use realized values of German export and import growth, as pub-
lished by the German statistical office.3 I use initial release national accounts data to minimize
the effects of data revisions. Furthermore, I adjust the reference time-series for every forecaster,
as the economic research institutes switch from forecasts for West-Germany to forecasts for re-
unified Germany at different points in time between 1992 and 1993. Following Behrens et al.
1HWWI became a privately funded institute in 2006.
2The sixth main German economic research institute (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle) is omitted, because
it has only been publishing forecasts since German reunification.
3Data taken from ”Wirtschaft und Statistik“ publications: ❤tt♣s✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❞❡st❛t✐s✳❞❡✴❊◆✴P✉❜❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s✴
❲✐rts❝❤❛❢t❙t❛t✐st✐❦✴❲✐rts❝❤❛❢t❙t❛t✐st✐❦✳❤t♠❧
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Trade Forecast Errors




38 0.218 1.348 2.272 0.45 49 -0.631 1.977 5.027 0.59
HWWI 33 -0.091 1.321 2.369 0.58 44 0.216 1.910 4.721 0.48
ifo 43 0.107 1.314 2.222 0.49 45 -0.349 1.891 4.653 0.58
IfW 42 0.188 1.344 2.437 0.40 47 -0.740 1.818 4.135 0.55
RWI 23 0.598 1.250 2.681 0.48 24 0.021 1.728 3.731 0.50
IMK 12 -0.592 1.228 2.082 0.50 42 -0.369 1.955 4.821 0.55
IW 19 -0.139 1.491 2.970 0.47 36 0.043 1.912 4.981 0.53
GD 48 -0.448 1.708 3.727 0.54 49 -0.017 2.001 5.265 0.53




38 0.650 1.410 2.824 0.42 49 -0.094 1.737 3.863 0.53
HWWI 33 0.236 1.421 2.696 0.39 43 0.509 1.765 3.946 0.42
ifo 43 0.021 1.264 2.214 0.42 45 0.036 1.632 3.384 0.49
IfW 42 0.521 1.358 2.319 0.38 47 0.294 1.663 3.399 0.49
RWI 23 0.867 1.447 3.400 0.39 24 0.592 1.676 3.955 0.50
IMK 12 -0.108 1.255 2.179 0.50 42 0.005 1.692 3.623 0.50
IW 19 0.274 1.467 2.711 0.42 28 -0.159 1.713 3.360 0.50
GD 49 0.076 1.527 3.101 0.47 47 0.242 1.788 4.186 0.49
Pooled 259 0.320 1.404 2.718 0.42 325 0.166 1.711 3.782 0.49
Notes: N: Number of observations. Mean error: ME = 1T ∑
T












2. e < 0: Share of negative forecast errors.
(2018b), I compute forecast errors by subtracting the realized values for German export or import
growth from the forecasted value of a given year, such that:
ei,t(h) = ŷi,t(h)− yt . (1)
Here, ei,t(h) denotes the forecast error made by economic research institute i for the year t =
1971− 2019 at a forecast horizon of h = 2,4 quarters and ŷi,t(h) denotes the export growth or
import growth forecast published by institute i in year t, which also depends on the forecast
horizon, h. Finally, yt denotes the realized value of German export or import growth for year t
for which the forecast was formed.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the analyzed forecast errors. There are more observations
available for the longer-term forecasts than for the shorter two-quarter-ahead forecasts. IMK con-
tributes the fewest observations, namely 12, for both trade aggregates at the two quarter forecast
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horizon, whereas most observations are available for DIW, namely 49 for the longer-term fore-
cast horizon for both trade aggregates. The pooled datasets contain 258 (259) observations for the
two-quarters-ahead export (import) growth forecasts and 336 (325) for the four-quarters-ahead
export (import) growth forecasts. As is to be expected, the root mean absolute error (RMAE)
and the root mean squared error (RMSE) statistics are higher for the longer-term forecast hori-
zon. Furthermore, all error statistics are generally higher than the values observed in the more
common studies of GDP and inflation forecasts (see, among others, Döpke et al., 2017; Behrens
et al., 2018a). This is due to the fact that trade aggregates are among the most volatile com-
ponents of German national accounts statistics and are, therefore, harder to predict (Döhrn and
Schmidt, 2011). The share of negative forecast errors should equal 0.5 if the forecasters, on av-
erage, do not overestimate or underestimate. For the four-quarter-ahead export growth forecasts
and the two-quarters-ahead import growth forecasts, the value deviates the most (i.e., by 0.06
and 0.08 percentage points) from the 0.50 value, hinting at a possible bias. This can also be
observed in Figure 1, which depicts boxplots of the data. The boxplots depict the distribution of
export and import growth forecast errors at both forecast horizons. For the two-quarters-ahead-
forecasts, denoted by EXq2 and IMq2, the forecast errors are more closely distributed around the
mean, resulting in more narrow boxplots. A longer forecast horizon causes a larger deviation
from the mean and hence broader boxplots. Furthermore, the boxplot for the four-quarters-ahead
export growth forecasts, EXq4, is shifted for a larger part below zero, again hinting at a possible
underestimation bias.
In order to model the information set of the economic research institutes at forecast formation, I
use typical trade variables as well as other macroeconomic variables commonly used to predict
economic growth. All variables enter the list of predictors in normalized form. In doing so,
I build on research by D’Agostino et al. (2017), who show that incorporating both types of
macroeconomic aggregates improve trade forecasts for the euro area. In order to minimize the
effects of data revisions, I use a backward-looking moving average of order 12 (see also, Behrens
et al., 2020). Based on a study by Drechsel and Scheufele (2012), I, furthermore, take publication
lags of the variables into account. In general, I assume that when a forecast is published, for
5



































































Note: EXq2: Two-quarter-ahead export growth forecast. EXq4: Four-quarter-ahead export growth forecast. IMq2:
Two-quarter-ahead import growth forecast. IMq4: Four-quarter-ahead import growth forecast.
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instance, in January, it is based on information available in December (Behrens et al., 2018b).
The list of predictors to proxy the forecasters’ information set includes:
• Industrial Orders: The year-on-year rate of change of the industrial orders received for
Germany indicates demand fluctuations (see, among others, Döpke et al., 2017, on using
industrial orders, inter alia, to predict German recessions).
• Unemployment rate: The monthly German unemployment rate in percent of civilian labor
is included following Behrens (2020) who finds evidence, using nonparamteric techniques,
that the unemployment rate might not be efficiently incorporated in German trade forecasts
(see also, D’Agostino et al., 2017, on improving trade forecasts by means of macroeco-
nomic variables such as the unemployment rate).
• Business climate: The monthly ifo tendency survey for German manufacturing enters the
list of predictors. Studies by Frale et al. (2010) and Lehmann (2015) suggest that survey
data is essential for the forecasting of exports in Europe.
• Production Germany: Year-on-year rate of change of the monthly German total manufac-
turing output. I follow Behrens et al. (2018a,b) who evaluate the efficiency of German
GDP growth and inflation forecasts by means of machine learning techniques.
• Production G7: The year-on-year rate of change of the monthly total manufacturing output
of the G7 is added as a leading indicator of the economic development of Germany’s main
trading partners, which is a crucial information for forecasters as Campos et al. (2019)
show that international business cycles are oftentimes synchronized (see also, Guichard
and Rusticelli, 2011, on improving trade forecasts by means of industrial production in-
dices).
• Oil price: Year-on-year rate of change of the monthly crude oil price (WTI) in dollars per
barrel. I follow Döpke et al. (2019a) in using the oil price as a proxy for input prices.
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• Leading Indicator: The monthly OECD composite leading indicator for Germany enters
the set of predictors. Heinisch and Scheufele (2018) use the OECD leading indicator for
Germany, inter alia, to forecast the German GDP.
• Real effective exchange rate (REER): Year-on-year rate of change of the monthly narrow
effective exchange rate for Germany (CPI-based). The REER serves as a measure of the
international price competitiveness of Germany (Grimme et al., 2018; Lehmann, 2015).
• Trade Policy Uncertainty Index (TPU): Monthly measure of media4 attention to news re-
lated to trade policy uncertainty. The TPU, developed by Caldara et al. (2019), is included
as a measure of uncertainty regarding international trade.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Forecast Efficiency and Unbiasedness Tests
In order to test for weak and strong efficiency as well as unbiasedness of German export and
import growth forecasts, I follow Döpke et al. (2019a), who build on research by Keane and
Runkle (1990) as well as Döpke and Fritsche (2006), and implement the Holden and Peel (1990)
approach to testing forecast efficiency and unbiasedness by means of a fixed-effects panel-
regression. Holden and Peel (1990) define a strong and weak form of efficiency, where the
former holds if the forecast error cannot be explained by information available to a forecaster at
the time of forecast formation. The latter form of efficiency holds if a forecast error cannot be
explained by its preceding forecast error (see also, Öller and Barot, 2000; Timmermann, 2007;
Behrens et al., 2020). I implement tests for weak and strong efficiency as well as unbiasedness
of the export and import growth forecasts by means of the following regression model:
ei,t(h) = β0 +β1ei,t(h)−1 +β jX j,i,t(h)−h +αi +λt(h)+ui,t(h). (2)
4For the construction of the trade policy uncertainty index, electronic archives of 7 leading U.S. newspapers
discussing trade policy uncertainty, namely Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Guardian, Los Angeles Times, New
York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, are analyzed by means of automated text-search (for details
on the construction of the index, see Caldara et al., 2019).
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Here, ei,t(h) again denotes the forecast error made by economic research institute i for the year
t = 1971−2019 with forecast horizon h = 2,4 quarters. X j,i,t(h)−h is the vector of j predictors,
available to institute i in period t(h)− h, when the forecast was formed, which depends on the
forecast horizon. λt(h) and αi are time and entity fixed effects. ei,t(h)−1 is the error of the forecast
of the previous year and ui,t(h) is the statistical error term.
5
As in Holden and Peel (1990), a forecast is considered as unbiased if the coefficient of the
intercept is not statistically significantly different from zero, i.e., if the null hypothesis, H0 :
β0 = 0, cannot be rejected. Strong efficiency of forecasts holds if the predictors do not have
statistically significant explanatory power for the forecast error, i.e., if the null hypotheses H0 :
β2 = 0,β3 = 0, ...,β j = 0 cannot be rejected. Analogously, a forecast is weakly efficient if the
null hypothesis H0 : β1 = 0 cannot be rejected, i.e., if the lagged forecast error is uncorrelated to
the forecast error.
I use both time and entity fixed effects in the regression model. In doing so, I control for effects
that equally affect all entities (i.e., economic research institutes) but change over time, such as oil
price shocks in the 1970s, as well as effects that are stable over time but change across entities,
such different forecast models or economic theories of the institutes. The former time fixed
effects, λt(h), can be interpreted as the element of surprise of a given year, which should have
strong influence on the forecast error when a crisis hits the economy for the first time. The latter
entity fixed effects, αi, in contrast, control for slightly differing forecast horizons due to different
publication dates of the economic research institutes (see also Döpke and Fritsche, 2006; Döpke
et al., 2019a).
Keane and Runkle (1990) argue that, when one analyzes the efficiency of forecasts by means of
a panel-regression model, the model needs to account for heteroskedasticity. A common way to
address this issue is to use the feasible generalized least squares estimator (Parks, 1967; Kmenta,
1986), which is sometimes referred to as the Parks estimator. However, Beck and Katz (1995)
5I roughly follow the notation used by Stock and Watson (2007).
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introduced the so called panel-corrected standard-errors estimator and showed that it performs
significantly better than the Parks estimator for finite samples. The PCSE estimator takes into ac-
count non-spherical errors, i.e., it is robust to unit heteroskedasticity as well as contemporaneous
correlation across units. The latter characteristic is especially crucial for this study, as it is reason-
able to assume that forecast errors are correlated across economic research institutes. The PCSE
estimator is similar to other heteroskedasticity consistent estimators, such as the ones brought
forward by Huber (1967), White (1980) or MacKinnon and White (1985), yet it is specifically
designed for time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data, having more observations along the time-
series dimension than the cross-section dimension (i.e., T > N). I, therefore, follow Döpke et al.
(2019a) and implement the PCSE estimator by Beck and Katz (1995) in my empirical analy-
sis. Due to the T > N-nature of the data, it is not necessary to control for a possible Nickell-bias
(Nickell, 1981; Arellano and Bond, 1991), even though the lagged dependent variable is included
in the estimation equation (Eq. 2), as was shown by Gaibulloev et al. (2014).
I use the R programming environment for statistical computing (R Core Team, 2020) to esti-
mate the fixed effects model, and I use the add-on package “pcse” (Bailey and Katz, 2011) to
compute Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors. Tables 2 and 3 present results
of efficiency tests for the full sample of export and import growth forecasts, respectively. Re-
garding two-quarter-ahead export growth forecasts (Table 2, top panel), I find evidence against
the strong form of efficiency. The predictors business climate, OECD leading indicator, and real
effective exchange rate have statistically significant explanatory power for the forecast error. The
forecasts are unbiased as, for all but one specification, the coefficients of the intercept terms are
insignificant. Furthermore, the coefficient of the lagged forecast error is not significant in any
specification, indicating that the two-quarters-ahead export growth forecasts are weakly efficient.
Tables 2 and 3 also show adjusted R2-statistics for the analyzed regression models (Eq. 2) with
time and entity fixed effects as well as for regression models using only entity fixed effects.6
For two-quarter-ahead export growth forecasts, the adjusted R2-statistics of the standard specifi-
6Detailed results of the regression models using only entity fixed effects are not reported but are available from
the author upon request.
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Table 2: Efficiency Tests of Export Growth Forecasts for Germany - Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Export Growth Forecast Error (Two-Quarters-Ahead)
Intercept
2.255 2.011 1.617 1.054 1.388 1.356 1.752 3.962** 1.422 1.394





























-0.049 -0.057 -0.050 -0.056 -0.051 -0.059 -0.057 -0.024 -0.055 -0.059
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066)
Observations 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258
Adjusted R2 0.784 0.780 0.786 0.781 0.781 0.780 0.792 0.789 0.780 0.781
Adjusted R2 0.001 -0.017 -0.014 0.015 0.037 -0.005 -0.017 0.049 0.005 -0.013
(w/o time FE)
Dependent Variable: Export Growth Forecast Error (Four-Quarters-Ahead)
Intercept
-4.157 9.514** -0.950** -2.365*** -1.489*** -0.774** -0.910** -0.627 -0.930**





























0.000 0.006 -0.003 -0.013 -0.009 0.009 0.022 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Adjusted R2 0.944 0.941 0.944 0.941 0.941 0.944 0.948 0.940 0.940 0.940
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.001 0.115 0.021 0.000 0.014 0.035 0.002 0.007 0.003
(w/o time FE)
Notes: Results are computed by means of an entity and time fixed effects regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE, Beck and Katz,
1995). PCSE in parentheses. Entity and time fixed effects are excluded to save journal space. W/o time FE: Model specification using only entity
fixed effects. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 %-level.
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cation vary around approximately 0.78, whereas the adjusted R2-statistics of the model without
time fixed effects range between -0.017 and 0.046. This indicates that a large part of the ex-
planatory power of the forecast error is linked to time fixed effects, i.e. the year for which a
forecast was formed. The time fixed effects can be interpreted as the element of surprise of a
given year. The results show the importance of using a time and entity fixed regression model,
when analyzing trade forecast errors.
The same holds for the four-quarters-ahead export growth forecasts, for which the adjusted R2-
statistics of the standard specification vary around approximately 0.94, whereas the adjusted R2-
statistics of the model without time fixed effects range between 0 and 0.115. Furthermore, these
forecasts are weakly efficient since the lagged forecast errors do not have significant explanatory
power for the forecast error. However, for the four-quarters-ahead forecast horizon, the forecasts
are biased, as was already indicated by the boxplot shown in Figure 1. The coefficients of the
intercepts are statistically significant for all specifications except for the regressions using the
real effective exchange rate and industrial orders. There is also evidence against the strong form
of forecast efficiency, as the coefficients of several predictors have significant explanatory power
for the forecast error, namely the coefficients of the predictors industrial orders, business climate,
German and G7 production, oil price, and OECD leading indicator.
Next, I turn to two- and four-quarters-ahead import growth forecasts for Germany, which are
reported in the top and bottom panel of Table 3. The forecasts with a shorter forecast horizon
are unbiased and weakly efficient, as neither the coefficients of the intercepts nor of the lagged
forecast errors are statistically significant. Yet, I reject the strong form of efficiency, as the
shorter-term import growth forecast error is linked to industrial orders, business climate, G7
production, the OECD leading indicator, and the real effective exchange rate. When comparing
the adjusted R2-statistics of the standard specification and the adjusted R2-statistics of the model
without time fixed effects, I again find that forecast errors are explained to a large part by time
fixed effects, as the former R2-statistics vary around 0.79, whereas the latter range between -0.02
and 0.046.
12
Table 3: Efficiency Tests of Import Growth Forecasts for Germany - Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Import Growth Forecast Error (Two-Quarters-Ahead)
Intercept
1.173 -2.284 0.171 -0.551 0.007 0.003 0.465 1.873 0.071 0.012





























-0.006 -0.014 -0.010 -0.016 -0.009 -0.015 0.022 0.004 -0.012 -0.013
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.790 0.793 0.792 0.794 0.790 0.801 0.795 0.790 0.791
Adjusted R2 -0.018 -0.020 0.046 0.001 0.005 0.025 0.001 0.031 -0.014 -0.016
(w/o time FE)
Dependent Variable: Import Growth Forecast Error (Four-Quarters-Ahead)
Intercept
-1.570*** -4.300 -2.077*** -3.219*** -2.439*** -1.990*** -2.032*** -0.717 -2.117*** -2.083***





























-0.034 -0.051 -0.048 -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.039 -0.041 -0.049 -0.049
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
Adjusted R2 0.915 0.911 0.911 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.917 0.912 0.911 0.912
Adjusted R2 0.024 -0.006 0.159 0.059 0.004 0.030 0.034 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008
(w/o time FE)
Notes: Results are computed by means of an entity and time fixed effects regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE, Beck and Katz,
1995). PCSE in parentheses. Entity and time fixed effects are excluded to save journal space. W/o time FE: Model specification using only entity
fixed effects. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 %-level.
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The four-quarters-ahead import growth forecast errors, reported in the bottom panel of Table
3, are biased just as their export growth counterparts. There is strong statistical significance of
the coefficients of the intercept terms in all but two specifications. I reject the strong form of
efficiency due to statistically significant dependency of the forecast error on industrial orders,
German and G7 production, as well as the OECD leading indicator. The weak form of efficiency
cannot be rejected, because the lagged forecast errors do not have explanatory power for the
forecast error. The forecast error is, however, explained to a large part by time fixed effects as is
indicated by the large difference of the adjusted R2-statistics of the regression models with and
without time fixed effects.
3.2 Crises Subsamples
In the spirit of the literature on the change of forecasting behavior after economic recessions
and especially the financial crisis of 2008 (Frenkel et al., 2011; Döpke et al., 2019a,b), on the
one hand, and the literature on the severe effects of economic recessions on international trade
and protectionist measures (Levchenko et al., 2010; Chor and Manova, 2012; Kee et al., 2013;
Eaton et al., 2016), on the other hand, I define several subsamples of the dataset. In doing so, I
capture possible changes in forecasting behavior in different periods of recent German history.
In contrast to the time fixed effects in the estimation equation (Eq. 2), which capture the effects
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I split the data based on Figure 2, which plots German export growth and import growth forecast
errors over time. Forecast errors produced by longer-term forecasts are depicted in dark grey,
whereas those errors produced by two-quarter-ahead forecasts are depicted in light grey. The first
subsample comprises forecast errors for the years 1971 to 1981. It is the smallest of the analyzed
subsamples, and it is characterized by relatively high and scattered forecast errors. Due to the two
oil price shocks in that period, I will refer to it as the “oil crises” subsample. The next subsample
spans from 1982 until 1992, and it is characterized by less widespread forecast errors than the
time period before. This subsample will be referred to as “West Germany”. The subsample after
all forecasters switched from forecasts for West Germany to forecasts for reunified Germany until
the financial crisis, i.e., 1994 to 2008, will be referred to as “reunified Germany”. Finally, the last
subsample, referred to as the “post financial crisis” subsample, contains forecast errors for the
years 2010 to 2019 and is the shortest subsample. The forecast errors for the years 1993 and 2009
are omitted as all forecasters produce very large forecast errors of up to 15 percentage points,
due to high uncertainty after German reunification and the financial crisis of 2008 (see also,
Döpke et al., 2019a, for a similar approach regarding forecast errors after the financial crisis).
All subsamples continue to be of the T > N-type, such that Equation (2) can still be estimated
by means of PCSE by Beck and Katz (1995). Tables 4 and 5 report results of efficiency and
unbiasedness tests for all subsamples for four-quarter-ahead export and import growth forecasts,
respectively.
Beginning with the export growth forecasts, it can be assessed that the results of the subsamples
do not differ severely from the ones computed by means of the full sample. For the “oil crises”
subsample, the results are very similar to the full sample, as forecasts are biased but weakly
efficient and there is evidence against the strong form of efficiency. Regarding the forecast errors
for the years 1982 to 1992, there continues to be evidence against the unbiasedness of export
growth forecasts. I reject the strong form of efficiency and, different from previous samples, I
find some evidence against the weak form of efficiency. This finding also holds for the subsample
“reunified Germany”, for which some of the coefficients of the lagged forecast error are also
statistically significant. Furthermore, there is less evidence against the unbiasedness of forecasts
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Table 4: Efficiency Tests of Four-Quarters-Ahead Export Growth Forecasts for Germany - Sub-
samples
Subsample: Oil Crises (1971 - 1981)
Intercept
-0.791* 5.823 -0.943** -0.989 -0.980* -1.038** -0.965** -1.682* -1.151** -0.966**





























0.007 0.012 -0.014 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.008
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.985 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.987 0.985 0.985 0.985
Adjusted R2 -0.047 0.056 0.159 -0.071 -0.071 0.260 -0.052 -0.070 -0.071 -0.049
(w/o time FE)
Subsample: West Germany (1982 - 1992)
Intercept
5.898*** 6.523*** 4.015** 7.547*** 5.342** 4.121** 8.119*** 4.516 4.008** 3.969**





























0.280* 0.253 0.231 0.272* 0.277* 0.239 0.191 0.231 0.234 0.233
(0.157) (0.160) (0.164) (0.152) (0.165) (0.162) (0.156) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163)
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.921 0.918 0.925 0.920 0.919 0.924 0.918 0.918 0.920
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.050 0.342 -0.106 0.079 -0.010 0.169 0.260 -0.111 -0.095
(w/o time FE)
Continued on next page.
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Continued from previous page.
Subsample: Reunified Germany (1994 - 2008)
Intercept
0.197 -3.301 -2.537** 0.814 -1.452 -2.735*** 0.071 -1.062 -2.613** -2.644***





























-0.129 -0.156* -0.137 -0.155* -0.144* -0.166* -0.108 -0.133 -0.162* -0.162*
(0.085) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.084) (0.088) (0.087)
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111
Adjusted R2 0.882 0.876 0.880 0.879 0.879 0.877 0.885 0.880 0.876 0.878
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.306 0.112 0.125 0.103 0.231 0.162 0.103 0.107 0.111
(w/o time FE)
Subsample: Post Financial Crisis (2010 - 2019)
Intercept
-1.235 -3.930 -5.121*** -0.728 0.104 -5.191*** -4.837*** -4.934*** -4.912*** -4.933***





























-0.226** -0.232** -0.202* -0.265*** -0.252*** -0.202* -0.182* -0.235* -0.219** -0.221**
(0.090) (0.113) (0.105) (0.096) (0.094) (0.107) (0.105) (0.096) (0.090) (0.091)
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.931 0.931 0.935 0.934 0.931 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.932
Adjusted R2 0.328 0.656 0.311 0.349 0.508 0.339 0.300 0.362 0.358 0.311
(w/o time FE)
Notes: Results are computed by means of an entity and time fixed effects regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE, Beck and Katz,
1995). Dependent variable: Export growth forecast error (four-quarters-ahead). PCSE in parentheses. Entity and time fixed effects are excluded
to save journal space. W/o time FE: Model specification using only entity fixed effects. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10
%-level.
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in this and the subsequent subsample. Yet, I still reject the strong form of efficiency. After
the financial crisis of 2008 I find only little evidence against the strong form of efficiency (see
the predictor industrial orders), however, I strongly reject the weak form of forecast efficiency
for this subsample in contrast to previous subsamples. Due to a large difference between the
adjusted R2-statistics of the standard specifications and the adjusted R2-statistics of the models
without time fixed effects, the results of the subsample analysis also suggest a strong influence
of time fixed effects on the export growth forecast error. It is striking that in the subsample
“post financial crisis” the R2-statistics of the model without time fixed effects are comparatively
high. This indicates that the element of surprise of a given year is less important in explaining
the forecast error than in previous samples, possibly because the forecast errors are the least
scattered in this subsample (see Figure 2).
Regarding the subsamples of the four-quarter-ahead import growth forecasts, reported in Table
5, a similar picture emerges for the adjusted R2-statistics. However, in contrast to their export
growth counterparts, I neither find a change in weak nor in strong efficiency of these forecasts
over time. Regarding unbiasedness, I find less evidence against the unbiasedness of forecasts of
the “reunified Germany” subsample. After the financial crisis of 2008 forecasters again form
biased forecasts. An explanation might be that the financial crisis led to more conservative
forecasts and a tendency of underestimation among the economic research institutes (see Döpke
et al., 2019b, for evidence of more cautious behavior of German professional forecasters after
the financial crisis). In all subsamples German four-quarter-ahead import growth forecasts are
weakly efficient, and I find evidence against the strong form of efficiency. The subsamples
differ with respect to the predictors which have statistically significant explanatory power of
the forecast error. In most cases the coefficients of the predictors industrial orders and leading
indicator are significant. The only predictor which is insignificant in all subsamples is the trade
policy uncertainty index.
Overall forecasting behavior does not change substantially over the subsamples. Yet, after the
financial crisis 2008/2009, I find stronger evidence, compared to antecedent subsamples, against
weak efficiency of export growth forecasts and against unbiasedness of import growth forecasts,
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Table 5: Efficiency Tests of Four-Quarters-Ahead Import Growth Forecasts for Germany - Sub-
samples
Subsample: Oil Crises (1971 - 1981)
Intercept
-1.651*** 0.993 -2.316*** -2.612 -2.371*** -2.457*** -2.298*** -1.450 -2.478*** -2.243***





























-0.128 -0.108 -0.140 -0.119 -0.120 -0.106 -0.127 -0.104 -0.117 -0.115
(0.099) (0.101) (0.106) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097) (0.088) (0.092) (0.100) (0.098)
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Adjusted R2 0.900 0.893 0.895 0.893 0.893 0.894 0.917 0.894 0.894 0.896
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.070 0.302 0.097 0.095 0.358 0.037 0.008 0.056 0.028
(w/o time FE)
Subsample: West Germany (1982 - 1992)
Intercept
3.260*** 1.383 1.756*** 4.917*** 2.737*** 1.681*** 1.260 1.370 1.745*** 1.750***





























-0.047 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.031 -0.058 -0.049 -0.054 -0.053 -0.054
(0.099) (0.108) (0.108) (0.097) (0.109) (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108)
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
Adjusted R2 0.924 0.912 0.912 0.928 0.916 0.913 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.914
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.067 0.371 -0.083 -0.004 0.251 0.201 0.102 -0.085 -0.076
(w/o time FE)
Continued on next page.
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Continued from previous page.
Subsample: Reunified Germany (1994 - 2008)
Intercept
-0.288 -1.564 -3.505*** -0.676 -1.920 -3.401*** -1.179 -1.726 -3.359*** -3.496***





























-0.060 -0.101 -0.095 -0.074 -0.065 -0.086 -0.060 -0.065 -0.093 -0.092
(0.075) (0.081) (0.082) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.076) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Adjusted R2 0.885 0.879 0.878 0.882 0.883 0.879 0.885 0.882 0.878 0.880
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.497 0.007 0.111 0.000 0.087 0.069 0.033 0.026 0.007
(w/o time FE)
Subsample: Post Financial Crisis (2010 - 2018)
Intercept
-4.058 -11.862** -5.879*** -6.640*** -6.648** -6.204*** -4.566*** -5.649*** -5.827*** -5.778***





























-0.137 -0.141 -0.127 -0.144 -0.188 -0.132 -0.118 -0.147 -0.139 -0.141
(0.117) (0.108) (0.111) (0.115) (0.732) (0.108) (0.108) (0.119) (0.111) (0.112)
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.850 0.855 0.847 0.847 0.851 0.855 0.847 0.847 0.850
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.360 0.161 0.428 0.583 0.215 0.136 0.140 0.128 0.142
(w/o time FE)
Notes: Results are computed by means of an entity and time fixed effects regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE, Beck and Katz,
1995). Dependent variable: Import growth forecast error (four-quarters-ahead). PCSE in parentheses. Entity and time fixed effects are excluded
to save journal space. W/o time FE: Model specification using only entity fixed effects. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10
%-level.
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indicating a change in forecasting behavior.
4 Concluding Remarks
I have built on the literature evaluating German trade forecasts (Behrens, 2020, 2019) by means
of panel regressions (Döpke and Fritsche, 2006, who evaluate GDP and inflation forecasts).
Furthermore, I have contributed to the literature on the effects of economic recessions on pro-
fessional forecasters (Frenkel et al., 2011; Döpke et al., 2018, 2019a). I have followed Döpke
et al. (2019a), who analyze German GDP and inflation forecasts, and have estimated a fixed ef-
fects panel regression using Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors. To this end, I
have used a novel data set on German trade forecasts for the years 1971 to 2019 of eight leading
German professional forecasters. To analyze possible changes in forecasting behavior, I have es-
timated the fixed effects model for subsamples after incisive economic events in recent German
history, namely the oil price shocks in the early and late 1970s, German reunification, and the
financial crisis of 2008/2009.
I find that all analyzed German trade forecasts in the full sample, i.e., export and import growth
as well as two- and four-quarter-ahead, are in line with the concept of weak efficiency. In other
words, the lagged forecast error does not have explanatory power for the current forecast error.
Furthermore, the shorter-term forecasts are not biased, whereas I find evidence against the un-
biasedness for both types of longer-term trade forecasts. I reject the strong form of efficiency
for all forecasts in the full sample. Predictors with explanatory power in most specifications are
mainly the OECD leading indicator and industrial orders for Germany. Time fixed effects, which
can be interpreted as the element of surprise of the year for which a forecast was formed, play a
crucial role in explaining the forecast errors.
Overall, the results for the subsamples with respect to strong efficiency resemble the ones for
the full sample, which is in line with recent research on possible changes in the behavior of
professional forecasters after the financial crisis (Döpke et al., 2019a). However, there are dif-
ferences regarding the weak form of efficiency of the export growth forecasts. Especially after
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the financial crisis, I strongly reject weak efficiency of these forecasts. Regarding import growth
forecasts, a bias is less of an issue after German reunification and before the financial crisis. Be-
fore and after this time period, I find strong evidence against the unbiasedness of the longer-term
import growth forecasts. In summary, I find changes in forecasting behavior of trade forecasters
after the financial crisis, namely regarding weak efficiency and unbiasedness. A possible expla-
nation is a tendency to more conservative forecasts after the financial crisis 2008/2009 as has
been reported by Döpke et al. (2019b).
In future research, it will be interesting to further analyze this change of forecasting behavior
and the reported bias of the longer-term trade forecasts. The latter effect could be explained by
further analyses of a possible asymmetry of the forecasters’ loss functions (building on research
by Behrens, 2019) or of possible behavioral biases in trade forecasts (see, e.g., Ito, 1990, on
wishful expectations). It will also be interesting to see, if the change in forecasting behavior
after the financial crisis can be confirmed for other macroeconomic aggregates as well as for the
period after the Covid-19 pandemic and the associated economic crisis.
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